This article examines legal and geopolitical aspects of the China-Taiwan Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). It begins by analyzing areas in which the two governments' measures contravene rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, it provides the first detailed examination of the significant implications emerging from the ECFA for cross-straits trade relations and East Asian regionalism. The article also explains how the ECFA was modeled on free trade agreements (FTAs) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and assesses the impact of the ECFA's early harvest program. Finally, the article discusses the ECFA's consistency with WTO requirements for an interim FTA agreement and potential legal issues arising from the dispute settlement mechanism. In this respect, the article presents a valuable case study of an FTA.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2010, China and Taiwan signed a landmark trade pact, known as the Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), in the Southwest Chinese city of Chongqing. 1 The ECFA marks the most important agreement between these two political rivals since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and intends to legally transform the cross-straits economic link. The ECFA is also significant from the viewpoint of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in terms of international relations. It not only serves as the world's first bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) concluded between WTO members with long-lasting sovereign disputes, but also accelerates the 'domino effect' in East Asian economic integration. 2 With a focus on the relevant geopolitical implications and WTO legal issues, this article examines the ECFA from a holistic perspective. The article argues that while East Asian regionalism and new cross-straits policies have provided a major impetus for the ECFA, this agreement will intensify trade relations across the Taiwan Strait and further ignite regional integration. Moreover, the ECFA constitutes an interim agreement to a full-fledged FTA between the signatories and is hence obliged to comply with both substantive and procedural requirements under WTO law. The article nonetheless cautions that due to limited jurisprudence and the lack of consensus on FTA requirements under WTO law, there remains possibilities for the two governments to depart from these requirements for their own policy considerations.
The article proceeds in five parts. Part II explores WTO-inconsistent measures that China and Taiwan have imposed on each other, as well as political and economic reasons contributing to such measures. Part III focuses on the strategic considerations that lie behind China's and Taiwan's FTAs and cross-straits trade policies. It explains how China aims at expanding its regional influence and 'rectifying' WTO-plus commitments included in its accession to WTO membership, while Taiwan seeks to avoid diplomatic and trade marginalization. Part IV analyzes the ECFA's key provisions and pertinent WTO legal issues. It addresses why China and Taiwan decided to follow the 'framework agreement' model that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) developed for its external FTAs and examines whether the ECFA's 'cross-straits characteristics' are consistent with WTO rules. Other crucial elements for prospective cross-straits economic integration, including the ECFA's early harvest program (EHP) and dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), will also be discussed, along with legal and policy recommendations. Part V concludes by outlining the ECFA's significance for cross-straits relations and for the broader multilateral trading system.
II. THE TAIWAN STRAIT AS A WTO-INCONSISTENT AREA
For nearly two decades following the Chinese Civil War, the political animosity between the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Mainland China and the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan prevented the two sides from developing normal trade relations. Nonetheless, trade volume across the Taiwan Strait has grown rapidly since the 1980s. The main change occurred as a result of China's attempt to attract Taiwanese investments, and Taiwan gradually liberalized restrictions on trade with China. 3 Bilateral economic ties accelerated after China and Taiwan joined the WTO in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 4 From 2002 to 2009, cross-straits trade soared from US$395 billion to $865.9 billion. 5 Despite diametrically opposed sovereign claims, China and Taiwan have become important trading partners. In fact, China is now Taiwan's number one trade partner, and Taiwan is China's fifth largest trade partner. 6 Not only does 70.5% of Taiwanese capital outflows to the Mainland make Taiwan China's second largest source of foreign direct investments (FDI), but Taiwan also runs the largest trade surplus with China. 7 'Chaiwan', a newly coined term that has emerged in Asian production networks, refers to products that are 'made by Taiwan, but made in China ' . 8 Notwithstanding their WTO membership and extensive economic interdependence, both governments have imposed WTO-inconsistent measures in cross-straits trade relations. To understand the ECFA's significance on developments across the Taiwan Strait, it is necessary to examine the political and economic considerations behind these measures.
A. China's trade measures concerning Taiwan
Even after Taiwan acceded to the WTO, Beijing declined to consider Taiwan's status as a 'separate customs territory' on par with China's 'full' WTO membership as a sovereign state. 9 The PRC's position is contrary to WTO law because Article XII of the WTO Agreement stipulates that WTO membership is open to both states and separate customs territories. 10 Although no WTO provision distinguishes between WTO members' rights and obligations based on the two categories of membership, Beijing's political mindset led to various WTO-inconsistent policies concerning Taiwan. These policies include both discriminatory and preferential measures.
First, China denies Taiwanese nationals' 'right of priority' under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). In general, after a manufacturer files its patent or trademark application in one country, it may well file applications in other countries to extend legal protection in those countries as well. This right of priority, which was first introduced into the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), allows subsequent applications to be treated as if they were filed on the date of the first application.
11 This concept efficiently protects intellectual property (IP) holders' legal interests and has been incorporated into the domestic laws of parties to the Paris Convention. The PRC is no exception, as both Chinese Patent Law and Trademark Law recognize the right of priority. 12 from the date on which any applicant first filed in a foreign country an application for a patent for invention or utility model, . . . he or it may, in accordance with . . . any international treaty to which both countries are party, . . . enjoy a right of priority'); PRC Trademark Law, Article 24 ('Any applicant for the registration of a trademark who files an application for registration of the same trademark for identical goods in China within six months from the date of filing the first application for the trademark registration overseas may enjoy the right of priority . . . according to the international treaty to which both countries are parties . . . ') (emphases added).
government agencies have refused to accept Taiwanese nationals' right of priority applications because the Paris Convention is a United Nations Treaty that governs 'state-to-state' relations inapplicable to Taiwan. 13 Taiwan's lack of member status in the Paris Convention, as well as the absence of bilateral arrangement with China, prevents Chinese IP authorities from handling Taiwanese applications. This practice contravenes WTO law because Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement specifically requires WTO members to comply with Article 4 of the Paris Convention. 14 In Taiwan's case, the lack of membership in the Paris Convention due to its political status should pose no obstacle for its nationals to enjoy the right of priority. Thus, China's denial of such right infringes the TRIPS Agreement.
Second, China's failure to enact implementing statutes for its WTO services commitments precludes Taiwanese professionals from benefiting from rights extended under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This issue arises from Taiwan's unique status in Chinese law, effectively placing Taiwan in legal limbo. More specifically, since Taiwan is not considered a 'foreign country', most statutes that implement China's services commitments for 'foreigners' do not directly apply to Taiwan. Legal services illustrate this problem. In its schedule of specific commitments under the GATS, China has opened the legal services market to foreign law firms by allowing them to establish representative offices in China. 15 To put this commitment into effect, the PRC State Council promulgated the Regulations on Administration of Foreign Law Firms' Representative Offices in China. 16 As of 2009, the government has granted 188 foreign law firms the right to operate representative offices. 17 Yet, these statutes do not apply to law firms based in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, all of whom are WTO members. As these three areas are considered Chinese Finally, in addition to the above-mentioned discriminatory measures, China's policies that accord Taiwan preferential treatment also contravene WTO law. During the economic reform era, China granted Taiwanese investors preferential treatment in order to attract capital. This treatment is dubbed a 'super national treatment' because it encompasses tax preferences to which Chinese enterprises are not entitled. China has gradually removed such preferential treatment during its transition period following WTO accession because it is inconsistent with the national treatment principle under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement). 22 However, to buttress its recent policy to 'buy the hearts of Taiwan compatriots', Beijing has adopted measures that are incompatible with WTO rules. The most renowned measure is its 'fruit diplomacy'. Immediately after passing the 2005 Anti-Secession Law that authorizes 'non-peaceful means' to prevent Taiwanese independence, Beijing granted zero-tariff status to 15 Taiwanese fruit items. 23 The political motivation behind this was conspicuous. Chinese leadership intended to ease Taiwan's fierce protests against the Law, particularly given that most fruit farmers in Southern Taiwan are faithful supporters of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In fact, the zero-tariff treatment's benefits were limited since it excluded bananas and mangos, Taiwan's top two export fruits, and because the profit margin was undermined by transportation costs and a 17% value-added tax. 24 27 As of March 2010, Taiwan still bans the importation of 865 agricultural products and 1,377 industrial products from China on security and commercial grounds. 28 The comprehensive import ban contravenes Articles I (MFN treatment) and XI (quantitative restrictions) of the GATT because Taiwan did not invoke the non-application clause concerning China in the WTO accession process. Neither can the ban be justified by exceptions under Article XX of the GATT. 29 Second, Taiwan currently declines to recognize academic degrees conferred by Chinese universities because the Ministry of Education seeks to prevent Taiwanese students from studying in China. 30 The underlying reason for this policy is that Taiwan's dwindling birthrate, which has made more than a third of 164 local universities face difficulties in recruiting students.
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This policy has had a discriminatory impact on Chinese professionals because they are ineligible for Taiwan's professional examinations that require a bachelor's degree in a relevant discipline. 32 of the GATS simply stipulates that 'a Member may recognize the education obtained' abroad. 33 Absent a bilateral 'agreement or arrangement' regarding this matter, 34 Taiwan is not obliged to accord recognition of Chinese educational credentials. This argument nonetheless cannot stand. Notably, Article VII of the GATS also emphasizes that such recognition cannot 'constitute a means of discrimination between countries' that apply comparable 'standards or criteria'. 35 As Taiwan recognizes degrees from Vietnam, India and Swaziland, it is difficult to contend that the standards or criteria of Chinese intuitions are inferior to or fundamentally distinguishable from their counterparts in these countries. 36 In addition, this policy will likely hurt Taiwan's competitiveness in the long run because it encourages elite Chinese graduates to go to Hong Kong and Singapore rather than Taiwan.
Finally, Taiwan imposes stringent restrictions on both outbound and inbound cross-straits investments. These restrictions aim to prevent Taiwan from being 'hollowed out' by Mainland Chinese investment and to maintain the country's economic competitiveness, particularly in the technology industry. Currently, the cap on Taiwanese companies' investments in China is 60% of their net worth and special approval is required if a project involves more than an accumulated US$50 million. 37 Restrictions on outbound investments are not within the purview of WTO law because the TRIMs Agreement is concerned primarily with inbound investment. In Taiwan's trade regime, foreign investments are subject to the 'negative list' that excludes only industries with security or environmental concerns. Chinese investments are nonetheless confined to the 'positive list' of 192 items, 38 which explains why there is less than US$1 billion Chinese investments in Taiwan in contrast to more than US$50 billion Taiwanese investments in China.
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Taiwan's restrictions in this respect are contrary to WTO law. These restrictions may survive legal challenges under the TRIMs Agreement because 33 Emphasis added. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Article VII:1. 34 Chinese investments, once allowed in Taiwan, are not subject to additional restrictions, such as local content requirements. Yet, in addition to the TRIMs Agreement that regulates goods-related investments, services-related investments are governed by the GATS. If a WTO member is committed to permitting the 'commercial presence' of foreign services providers (known as GATS Mode 3), the member is also obliged to 'allow such [associated] movement of capital' into its market. 40 Consequently, Taiwan's measures that allow Chinese investments in only 22% of the items of its services schedule 41 infringe on Chinese investors' rights under the GATS if Chinese investors set-up commercial presence in Taiwan concerning other items.
The analysis above illustrates WTO-inconsistent measures that China and Taiwan have adopted for cross-straits trade. From a legal perspective, a breached party will mostly likely resort to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism that has compulsory jurisdiction over legal matters arising from WTO agreements. However, an anomaly in cross-straits relations is that neither side has filed a WTO compliant against the other. On the one hand, China intends to avoid 'internationalization' of cross-straits matters. In its view, the utilization of the WTO tribunals may create the image of 'state-to-state' relations with Taiwan, thus diminishing Beijing's sovereign assertion over the island. On the other hand, Taiwan also has been hesitant to bring WTO complaints against China due to the scale of its own WTO-inconsistent measures. 42 Bringing actions against Beijing may also compel it to revoke preferential treatment for Taiwanese enterprises, which would in turn undercut financial support for Taiwan's ruling party.
III. REASONS FOR SIGNING THE ECFA IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM
The process that began with WTO-incompatible measures leading to WTO-plus treatment under the ECFA represents a significant advance not only in cross-straits economic ties, but also in East Asian regionalism. This fundamental change would not have been possible but for the new FTA and the respective cross-straits policies of China 44 The ECFA with Taiwan may lead to China's eleventh FTA. There are salient, yet different, geopolitical and economic considerations behind Beijing's FTA strategy. First, China's CEPAs with Hong Kong and Macau were intended to implement the 'one country, two systems' scheme, originally 'designed' for Taiwan. 45 These CEPAs became the two first FTAs concluded between customs territories within the same country. To justify China's takeover of Hong Kong and Macau, the continuing economic success of these two Special Administrative Regions (SARs) was seen to be vital. Beijing's unilateral concessions under the CEPAs were deemed to be 'gifts' that would salvage Hong Kong's and Macau's economic downturn resulting from the SARS outbreak. Because Hong Kong and Macau are WTO members, the CEPAs (which are FTAs under Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS) prevent other WTO members from claiming MFN treatment.
Second, China considers FTAs a mechanism to 'rectify' the discriminatory WTO-plus obligations to which it committed in exchange for WTO membership. 46 In particular, China is concerned about its trading partners' 'abuse' of China's non-market economy status in trade remedies cases.
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This status allows WTO members to select surrogate markets (e.g. India or Turkey) for calculating the normal value of Chinese exports, frequently making Chinese companies liable in foreign anti-dumping proceedings. 48 In 2009 alone, 38% of worldwide anti-dumping investigations were directed against China, making the country the number one target of such proceedings. 49 China intends to tackle this issue on a bilateral basis by asking its FTA partners to recognize its market economy status in their respective FTAs. 50 Finally, China's FTA strategy is an integral part of its 'peaceful rise' policy, which aims to escalate Chinese regional influence in both political and economic arenas. FTAs with neighboring countries will not only ease concerns over the 'China threat', but also safeguard foreign markets, as well as raw material imports. More importantly, China intends to counterbalance US influence in the region. While China acknowledges the United States' inherent role in Asia, it has been reluctant to incorporate the United States in East Asian regionalism. This attitude is reflected in Beijing's keen support of the East Asian Economic Community (EAEC) on the 'ASEAN Plus Three' basis and its lukewarm approach to the US-proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) including 21 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies. 51 The key difference in membership between the EAEC and the FTAAP is that the former excludes both the United States and Taiwan. Although it is still premature to assert that China is implementing its own Monroe Doctrine in Asia, Beijing's FTA strategy illustrates its concerns about US 'intervention' in the region. When the anti-China Democratic Progressive Party was in office in Taiwan from 2000 to 2008, the PRC fiercely opposed Taiwan's FTA efforts. 52 Beijing once declared that under its 'one-China principle', any countries that sign FTAs with Taiwan would 'bring political trouble to themselves'. 53 China was concerned that any official agreements with Taiwan would constitute implied recognition of the island. However, China faced a dilemma. Its isolation policy limited ties with Taipei and strengthened Taiwan's hostile attitude toward Beijing. This attitude, in turn, also worked to fortify the DPP's popularity in Taiwanese elections. The year 2005 became a turning point when Lien Chan visited China. 54 Lien was then the chairman of Taiwan's opposition party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT or Kuomintang). His trip was symbolically important, given that he was the first KMT chairman to visit the Mainland since Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan in 1949.
Lien's visit was motivated by the KMT's concern about worsening cross-straits relations and by the party's intention to establish contact with Chinese leadership. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also seized the opportunity presented by Lien's visit because the CCP anticipated that the KMT would adopt a more Beijing-friendly policy should it win Taiwan's 2008 presidential election. In the long term, Beijing also expected that cross-straits economic integration would promote political reunification. Lien's trip culminated in the KMT-CCP joint declaration, in which the two parties agreed to promote 'peace and development' by establishing a bilateral 'economic cooperation mechanism'. 55 This declaration was not legally binding because the DPP administration did not designate signing authority to the KMT. Nonetheless, it first provoked the idea of creating a cross-straits trade agreement and paved the way for subsequent ECFA negotiations.
B. Taiwan's goal to prevent diplomatic and trade isolation
Taipei's motivations for concluding the ECFA should be understood in tandem with its FTA strategy. Taiwan is one of the robust 'little dragons' in East Asia, now the world's most FTA-active region with 45 FTAs in place. 56 Taiwan and North Korea remain the only two Asian countries excluded from regional economic integration. In the early 21st century, product (GDP) by 0.836%. 68 These declines would occur because competition from China, Korea, Japan and ASEAN is likely to replace Taiwanese exports.
To counter Taiwan's marginalization in FTA networks and expand the country's space in such networks, the newly elected Taiwan President Ying-jeou Ma of the KMT proposed the 'flexible diplomacy' with a two-fold goal in 2008.
69 First, Taiwan is to 'normalize' economic ties with China by concluding a bilateral FTA, which is expected to allow Taiwanese businesses to maintain their advantages in the Chinese market. Taiwan also hopes to circumvent the 'investment diversion effect', which has prompted foreign and domestic investors to relocate to China due to Taiwan's restrictions on Chinese investments. In addition, the Taiwanese government expects to attract FDI, as well as 'go home' investments by China-based Taiwanese enterprises. The ECFA is thus an indispensible building block for Taiwan to constitute a regional hub that attracts foreign enterprises to establish headquarters or research and development (R&D) centers on its territory. Additional inflow investments and the increase of employment will further boost Taiwan's economy. Second, Taiwan will be more pragmatic in its FTA efforts. It will no longer insist on the use of 'Taiwan' or the 'Republic of China' for its name in FTAs. 70 Moreover, the ECFA will ease the chilling effect on potential FTA partners for Taiwan because it is difficult for Beijing to assert that 'we can sign an FTA with Taiwan, but other countries cannot do the same'.
After Ma took office in 2008, the KMT immediately resumed economic negotiations with China, which had been suspended for 11 years. 71 In just two years, both governments concluded 12 agreements that liberalize restrictions on financial services, postal services, sea and air transport, tourism and food safety. 72 To echo Ma's conciliatory approach, Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed again that Beijing's Taiwan policy would focus on enhancing bilateral commercial ties by signing 'an economic cooperation agreement', represented by today's ECFA. 73 Interestingly, while a domino effect of potential trade diversion was the main motivation for the ECFA, its conclusion has had the paradoxical effect of promoting the proliferation of regional FTAs in East Asia. A round of selective and competitive bilateral deals has followed. For instance, 60% of Korean exports to China worth US$60 billion compete with Taiwan in the Chinese market. 74 The fact that the ECFA's early harvest program alone would impair Korea's trade interests in the amount of US$12 billion gravely concerned Korean industries and caused the Korean government to feel pressured to accelerate FTA negotiations with China. 75 Similarly, after the ECFA, Singapore immediately announced its plan to negotiate an FTA with Taiwan. 76 A prospective Taiwan-Singapore FTA may prompt other ASEAN countries to negotiate FTAs with Taiwan. Moreover, Hong Kong's conclusion of an FTA with New Zealand after the CEPA also suggests Beijing's implied acquiescence toward 'delinking' sovereignty with trade agreements. 77 These new developments indicate that the ECFA would both integrate Taiwan in regional economic integration networks and accelerate East Asian regionalism.
IV. CONTENTS OF THE ECFA AND WTO LEGAL ISSUES
China and Taiwan conducted separate feasibility studies on the ECFA. The results of the studies were positive for both economies. The ECFA is expected to increase Taiwan's GDP by 1.65% and the balance of trade by US$17.2 billion while augmenting China's GDP by 0.63% and its balance 73 of trade by US$58.97 billion. 78 Since the beginning of 2010, expert groups and negotiators from both sides have discussed the title and basic structure for the ECFA. 79 The negotiations were concluded with the signing of the ECFA, along with the Cross-Straits Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Cooperation (Cross-Straits IPR Agreement). 80 Both agreements took effect in September 2010 following the completion of China's and Taiwan's domestic implementation procedures. 81 Modeled on the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, the ECFA provides a legal basis for negotiating subsequent agreements. Within six months, China and Taiwan will negotiate four agreements that govern trade in goods, trade in services, investments and dispute settlement. 82 These agreements will become an integral part of the ECFA. 83 Like most FTAs, the ECFA also contains a termination clause, which is the agreement's ultimate safety valve, 84 although neither China nor Taiwan would likely annul the ECFA in light of current cross-straits developments.
A. ASEAN framework agreements as the ECFA's model
Notwithstanding the ECFA's economic nature, the signing of the agreement was a political decision. Searching for an appropriate FTA model was the prime task for negotiators, particularly given the wide range of FTAs that differ in title and scope. It is thus important to explain why China and Taiwan followed the 'ASEAN framework agreements' approach rather than 'one-step' FTAs or CEPAs. A normal one-step FTA was not acceptable to either Beijing or Taipei. In China's view, a cross-straits pact entitled 'FTA' would suggest inter-state relations under international law. 85 Furthermore, an FTA that immediately liberalizes both sides' WTO-inconsistent measures would incur fierce opposition from domestic industries. In Taiwan, a referendum result opposing the ECFA could have even constitutionally blocked the administration from continuing negotiations under Taiwanese law. 86 Politically speaking, Beijing wished to adopt the CEPA model for a cross-straits trade pact because it would show the supremacy of the central government over its own separate customs territories. For example, China and Hong Kong signed the CEPA in 2003, and subsequently signed seven supplemental agreements to further liberalize bilateral trade in goods and services. 87 Nevertheless, this approach was unacceptable to Taipei for several reasons.
First and foremost, the CEPA approach would downgrade the status of Taiwan to that of Hong Kong by implying that Taiwan fell under the PRC's jurisdiction. China's careful choice of the word 'arrangement (an pai)', instead of 'agreement (xie ding)', in the CEPA's title avoids acknowledgment of the CEPA as an international instrument. Meanwhile, Article 2 of the CEPA specifically recognizes the PRC's 'one China, two systems' as a political precondition. 88 The fact that the China-Hong Kong CEPA was signed by the PRC's Vice Minister of Commerce and Hong Kong SAR's Financial Secretary indicates the internal nature of the CEPA. These political shadings made the CEPA approach unacceptable to the Taiwanese leadership. Second, the CEPA not only recognizes China's market economy status, but also makes anti-dumping and countervailing measures on products from either side inapplicable. 89 Giving up such measures to counter the potential rapid inflow of Chinese products would cause serious concern to Taiwanese businesses. Finally, the CEPA's politically oriented dispute settlement mechanism provided limited guidance for resolving disputes. Article 19 of the CEPA merely stipulates that a Joint Steering Committee comprised of senior officials will deal with CEPA matters 'through consultation in the spirit of friendship and cooperation'. 90 The CEPA does not include procedures for resorting to this mechanism, nor does it envision further negotiations over a detailed dispute settlement agreement. This deficiency is compounded by the fact that the CEPA lacks investor-state arbitration, which would be of paramount importance to Taiwanese investors in China. These distinctive features of the CEPA incurred fierce opposition in Taiwan and made it undesirable for the ECFA to follow the CEPA model. Indeed, the KMT government had to change the name of the proposed agreement from the 'Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement' (CECA) to 'ECFA' because the former suggests that it was a Taiwan version of the CEPA.
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Distinguishable from a one-step FTA and the CEPA, ASEAN's framework agreements provide a suitable model for both China and Taiwan. The ECFA's title as 'framework agreement', instead of 'FTA', would avoid sovereignty concerns. Under WTO law, a framework agreement, known as an 'interim agreement' under Article XXIV of the GATT, is the lowest level of economic integration leading to a full FTA. 92 In practice, ASEAN collectively has concluded FTAs with China, Korea, Japan and India on the basis of bilateral framework agreements. 93 This building block approach suits politically sensitive trade ties across the Taiwan Strait. Among ASEAN's FTAs, negotiators from China and Taiwan pay particular attention to the China-ASEAN FTA that was finalized in 2010. 94 The October 2010). 95 Ibid. negotiating these subsequent agreements leading to a final FTA within the 10-year timeframe. 96 In general, ASEAN's framework agreements contain certain features that make them cornerstones for ultimate WTO-plus FTAs. First, the framework agreement includes an 'early harvest program', which immediately liberalizes trade in goods. 97 The EHP's coverage is often seen as a political benchmark for parties' 'sincerity' regarding economic integration. Invariably, the EHP is the core of framework agreement negotiations. Second, the goods that the EHP does not cover will be placed on 'normal' and 'sensitive' tracks subject to different timeframes and rates of tariff reduction. 98 The lists of goods on these two tracks are negotiated as part of the subsequent agreement on trade in goods. The fact that 'sensitive' goods would be allowed a longer period for, or even be immune from, liberalization also allows vulnerable domestic industries to gradually transform and upgrade themselves to cope with competition. Finally, the framework agreement provides a timetable for other enabling agreements that lead to an FTA. 99 Thus, parties are legally bound to engage in subsequent negotiations. As a whole, the enabling agreements under the framework agreement result in an FTA that accords WTO-plus treatment to contracting parties.
B. The early harvest program and prospective liberalization
The various features and negotiation models of ASEAN framework agreements have influenced the ECFA's negotiations and structure. The final text of the ECFA includes 16 articles in five chapters, along with five annexes.
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Because the EHP will directly impact industries' trade interests, the coverage under the EHP was at the center of ECFA negotiations. To understand the EHP and prospective liberalization in cross-straits trade, it is important to first discuss the evolution of the negotiating mechanism and Beijing's 'making concessions (rang li)' policy. 96 China-ASEAN Framework Agreements, Article 2. 97 China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, Article 6. Pakistan used the 'agreements on the early harvest program (EHP)' as the preliminary step for FTAs. The scope of these agreements, which solely stipulate the EHP, is narrower than that of ASEAN's framework agreements. As the Preamble to the ECFA indicates, this landmark agreement was concluded based on 'equality and reciprocity'. 101 The ECFA was signed between two semi-official organizations, China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). While the former is under the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC State Council, the latter falls under the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC Executive Yuan. The creation of the ARATS and SEF allowed both sides' policies to avoid 'official' contact. The ARATS-SEF formula distinguishes the ECFA from the CEPA, as the latter was concluded between the central government and its SAR. Unlike the CEPA, the ECFA contains neither the 'one China, two systems' precondition nor political discourse concerning reunification of both sides. This equal political status between Beijing and Taipei was a cornerstone of ECFA negotiations. In addition, the ECFA expects the current negotiating mechanism to evolve. The ECFA mandates that both governments establish a 'Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee' (CSEC Committee) to deal with negotiations for the subsequent four agreements. 102 This CSEC Committee, composed of senior officials from both sides, will be the first 'joint' organization in cross-straits relations. These officials will represent relevant ministries directly in charge of trade affairs. Hence, the CSEC Committee intends to be more efficient than the ARATS-SEF mechanism. By its nature, the ECFA is a trade agreement, but it will be interesting to see whether the operation of a joint committee will provide a precedent for cross-straits political affairs.
Moreover, it took less than a year from the initial negotiations of the ECFA to the final inking. 103 This accelerated process has primarily been attributed to PRC leadership's political decision to 'make concessions' to Taiwan. 104 It was this decision that broke the negotiating impasse over liberalization of coverage under the EHP. Beijing applied a similar concession-making strategy to CEPA and CAFTA negotiations. From China's perspective, the long-term political gains from these FTAs surmounted economic interests. This realization is particularly true in the case of the ECFA because the KMT will face intense challenges from the DPP in Taiwan's 2012 presidential election. Beijing is reluctant to see negative results from the ECFA orient Taiwan's election results in favor of the DPP, which could reverse Taipei's China-friendly policy.
This background contributes to several unique features of the ECFA's early harvest program. As the EHP covers trade in goods and services, it is the world's first EHP that includes trade in services. Due to Beijing's concession-making policy, the ECFA is an interim agreement that includes the world's most imbalanced EHP with the largest scale of liberalization ever seen. On the subject of trade in goods, for example, Beijing will eliminate or lower tariffs on 539 Taiwanese items, accounting for 16.1% of China's imports from Taiwan and totaling US$138.4 billion. 105 In contrast, Taipei will only do the same for 267 Chinese items, accounting for 10.5% of Taiwan's imports from China and totaling US$28.6 billion. 106 Under the ECFA, the percentage of liberalization in cross-straits trade is significant, particularly in comparison with the early harvest program of the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, which only accounts for 1.8% of bilateral trade. 107 The unilateral concession on the agricultural sector is particularly noteworthy. While China agreed to accord preferential tariffs to 18 Taiwanese agricultural products, Taiwan will continue its MFN-inconsistent ban on the importation of 830 Chinese agricultural products and will not lower tariffs on 1,415 such products.
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Similar to its motivation for the 'fruit diplomacy', Beijing attempted to ease Taiwanese farmers' opposition to the ECFA. Consequently, the ratio of liberalization as to China's and Taiwan's commitments under the EHP is 2:1 in items and 5:1 in monetary value. 109 Both sides agreed to gradually eliminate tariffs on EHP items over two years, depending on existing tariffs. In this manner, they expect to reach their goal of zero tariffs for the EHP in January 2013. Compared to liberalization in trade in goods, the scope of the EHP's liberalization in services is limited. China will open 11 services sectors to Taiwan, whereas Taiwan will open 9 sectors to China. 111 Overall, China accords Taiwan WTO-plus treatment, whereas the scope of Taiwan's liberalization is mostly on a par with its WTO commitments.
The ECFA is undoubtedly important to industries. Indeed, business interests primarily account for the ECFA tug-of-war negotiations. In terms of goods liberalization, the ECFA largely alleviates the threat of 'trade diversion' for Taiwan because the EHP includes 20% of Taiwanese products that would be disadvantaged by the CAFTA and 17% of products that are in direct competition with products of Korean and Japanese origin. 112 The most significant beneficiaries are Taiwanese manufacturers of petrochemical products, machine tools and textiles.
113 Although 88 petrochemical products are included in the EHP, these items account for only 10% of the items that Taiwan initially requested. 114 Due to intense opposition from Chinese state-owned petrochemical enterprises, Beijing insisted on excluding most petrochemical products from the EHP, particularly Taiwan's competitive polyvinyl chloride (PVC). 115 This fact demonstrates Chinese enterprises' growing influence in FTA negotiations and their ability to set boundaries on the government's concession-making policies.
With respect to trade in services, the banking industry benefits most. Chinese banks will be allowed to establish branches in Taiwan and engage in the New Taiwan dollar business.
116 Similar to the China-Hong Kong CEPA, China will allow Taiwanese banks to set up branches and conduct Renminbi business after they operate for two years and earn profit for 111 Fifth Chiang-Chen Meeting, above note 105. 112 Ibid. 113 Petchems, 25 June 2010, Icis.Com, available at http://www.icis.com/Articles/2010/06/25/ 9371075/china-taiwan-ecfa-deal-excludes-pvc-from-list-of-88-petchems.html (visited 11 October 2010). Interestingly, China accords zero-tariff treatment to PVC from ASEAN, but declined to do so for Taiwan. The reason is that PVC factories in ASEAN (particularly Singapore) are primarily invested by Japanese and their high-end products with higher costs that are not likely to compete with Chinese products, as their Taiwanese counterparts may do.a year. 117 In addition, the ECFA accords more preferential terms than the CEPA for Taiwanese banks that engage in Renminbi business with Taiwanese enterprises in China. 118 This 'CEPA-plus' treatment may prompt Hong Kong and Macau to request further liberalization from China in financial services. The ECFA will thus indirectly accelerate economic integration between China, Hong Kong and Macau as well.
The early harvest program of the ECFA is only an 'appetizer' for the prospective cross-straits free-trade area. It is expected that further liberalization of goods, services and investments will be covered in subsequent agreements along with IPR issues. For instance, the ECFA's 'economic cooperation' section includes reference to 'intellectual property rights protection and cooperation'. 119 This section should be read in tandem with the Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, signed simultaneously with the ECFA. As discussed previously, China does not accept Taiwanese nationals' 'right of priority' applications because the Paris Convention does not apply to Taiwan. Under the Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, this TRIPS-inconsistent measure will be abolished since both sides are obliged to extend the right of priority to patent, trademark and plant variety applications. 120 The Cross-Straits IPR Agreement also offers protection for geographical indications and well-known trademarks. 121 This protection is vital to Taiwanese exporters because it has been common for Chinese manufacturers to fabricate or maliciously register the names of Taiwanese products, such as Alishan high mountain tea, Chishan rice and Yonghe soybean milk. 122 The Cross-Straits IPR Agreement provides a mechanism for the PRC and ROC IP authorities to discuss these matters and enforce IP rights. The ECFA, built on the basis 117 Ibid., at 9. See Table 1 : Good Items in the 'Early Harvest' List, Economics: Taiwan-China:
A Quick Look at the ECFA, above note 113 (stating that this 'is the same treatment China offered to Hong Kong banks under the CEPA, and superior to the WTO treatment (requiring 3 years of operation and 2 years of profits)'). 118 ECFA Annex IV, above note 116, at 9; see of the Cross-Straits IPR Agreement, obliges both sides to engage in negotiations with respect to the eventual scope and plan of IPR protection.
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Hence, the ECFA and its enabling agreements will likely prompt both China and Taiwan to gradually reduce WTO-inconsistent measures and make the future cross-straits FTA a WTO-plus one.
C. The WTO consistency of the ECFA as an interim agreement
The ECFA's imbalanced liberalization and unique 'cross-straits characteristics' have stirred intense discussions about the consistency of FTA requirements under WTO law. Given that WTO members lack consensus on most substantive requirements, the ECFA cannot be labeled as WTO-inconsistent. However, as the ECFA's unique 'cross-straits characteristics' depart from traditional interim agreements, these features will likely be subject to the WTO's intense scrutiny. During ECFA negotiations, Taiwan intended to include an 'international linkage' provision that 'requires' Beijing not to block Taiwan's FTAs with its trade partners. 124 China also proposed the inclusion of cross-straits trade 'normalization' in the ECFA's text with the intention of obliging Taiwan to remove all barriers to Chinese exporters and service-providers. 125 A mutual compromise was not to include these provisions, but to adopt relatively vague provisions that incorporate the 'concepts' on which both sides insisted. The ECFA aims to 'gradually reduce or eliminate barriers to trade and investment' in compliance with the WTO's 'basic principles'.
126 While recognizing these principles, they also agreed to take into account their respective 'economic conditions'. 127 This provision illustrates Taiwan's reluctant promise to entirely remove its trade barriers on China and raises controversies as to the ECFA's consistency with FTA procedural and substantive requirements. Ibid. and Taiwan to notify the WTO 'before the application of preferential treatment' under the ECFA. 128 Like the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, the ECFA is an 'interim agreement necessary for' or 'leading to' a cross-straits free-trade area. 129 Although the difference between an 'interim agreement' and a final regional trade agreement (RTA) exists for the purposes of the Transparency Mechanism, no distinction between the two has been drawn with respect to their WTO notification requirement. 130 In fact, none of the trade agreements concluded to date among WTO members have been notified as interim agreements. For example, despite its 'interim' nature indicated by a 10-year transitional period, the EC-Chile Interim Agreement was reported to the WTO as a full agreement. 131 Given that the ECFA is based on Article XXIV of the GATT and Article IV of the GATS, China and Taiwan are required to notify the Council for Trade in Goods and the Council for Trade in Services as required by the Transparency Mechanism. 132 As the ECFA took effect in September 2010 and its early harvest program will be implemented on 1 January 2011, the notification requirement should be completed prior to that date. 133 
Procedural requirements

Substantive requirements
While the procedural WTO notification requirement does not pose problems for the ECFA, disputes arise when it comes to the ECFA's consistency with substantive FTA requirements. These substantive requirements were also at the core of the ECFA debate between Taiwan President Ma and Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP Chairman, in April 2010. 134 Article XXIV:5(c) of the GATT mandates that an interim agreement contain 'a plan and schedule for the formation of . . . a free trade area within a reasonable length of time.'
135 These requirements should be interpreted interdependently. First, neither WTO rules nor jurisprudence set out a degree of specificity concerning a 'plan and schedule'. Nevertheless, a holistic interpretation of the Transparency Decision would reveal that the plan and schedule must contain enough information for the WTO Secretariat to prepare a factual presentation, including 'when the agreement is to be implemented by stages'. 136 The term 'by stages' should refer to a requirement as to when the interim agreement will lead to a final FTA rather than when the EHP under such an agreement will be implemented. For instance, the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement not only provides that the CAFTA will be created 'within 10 years', 137 but also includes a specific timeframe that requires the subsequent Agreement on Trade in Goods to commence in 2003 and to be concluded in 2004. 138 Article 8(1) further sets 2010 and 2015 as deadlines for the implementation of the CAFTA for different groups of ASEAN states. 139 Unlike the China-ASEAN Framework Agreement, the ECFA neither mentions a 10-year transitional period nor sets a deadline for the completion of the cross-straits FTA. The ECFA only requires both sides to commence negotiations regarding trade in goods and services 'within 6 months' after the ECFA takes effect and to 'expeditiously conclude' these negotiations. 140 In other words, the ECFA arranges for open-ended negotiations for completing the cross-straits FTA. Remarkably, it was this 'open-ended' nature that galvanized the United States to heavily criticize the China-Pakistan FTA.
Although not a single interim agreement that lacks a specific plan and schedule has been found 'invalid' under WTO law, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 authorizes 'the working party' to impose a plan and schedule that parties are required to follow. 142 The working party is now the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA), which aims to examine FTAs/RTAs while considering systemic issues. 143 Thus, when reviewing the ECFA, the CRTA may find the ECFA's plan and schedule insufficient and consider imposing a more specific one, although this is likely a hypothetical concern given continuing deadlock in the CRTA over the approval of RTAs generally.
With respect to the 'reasonable length of time' requirement for FTAs, the understanding stipulates that it 'should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases'. 144 To date, no WTO jurisprudence or report has defined what constitutes 'exceptional cases'. Moreover, it is common practice for FTAs' transition periods to be extended to 12 years. 145 For instance, under the Australia-US FTA, the United States committed to eliminating its tariffs on Australian beef after 18 years; and under the Korea-US FTA, Korea included a 20-year phase-out period for its tariffs on US-produced Fuji apples. 146 The WTO has found none of these FTAs WTO-inconsistent. In fact, neither Article XXIV of the GATT nor the Understanding would render a FTA invalid simply because its transitional period exceeds 10 years. Therefore, the ECFA's validity is unlikely to be affected by the absence of a defined transition period or by the fact that it may take longer than 10 years to create the cross-straits FTA.
Also significant is the presence of certain 'non-standard' legal terminology within the ECFA to allow Taiwan the flexibility to liberalize the coverage of goods and services in subsequent negotiations. According to Article XXIV:8(b) of the GATT, an FTA has to meet the 'substantially all the trade' requirement with respect to trade in goods. 147 The ECFA, nonetheless, stipulates that tariffs and non-tariff barriers will be reduced or eliminated on 'a substantial majority of goods' in bilateral trade.
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Furthermore, while an FTA that liberalizes trade in services has to satisfy the 'substantial sectoral coverage' requirement under Article V:1(a) of the GATS, 149 the ECFA merely commits to reducing or eliminating discriminatory measures 'on a large number of sectors'. 150 The fact that these terms in the ECFA are different from those in the GATT and the GATS does not 'authorize' the cross-straits FTA to depart from WTO rules. The cross-straits FTA, which may 'exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases', is required to adhere to both 'substantially all the trade' and 'substantial sectoral coverage' requirements.
Regarding the 'substantially all the trade' requirement, the Appellate Body in Turkey -Textiles only found the requirement to be 'something considerably more than merely some of the trade,' but 'not the same as all the trade'. 151 trade affected and modes of supply'. 155 Furthermore, an FTA 'should not provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply'. 156 The above definitions reveal that although the GATS does not require liberalization of all services sectors, the exclusion of major sectors may render the FTA inconsistent with the 'substantial sectoral coverage' requirement. Therefore, prospective Cross-Straits Agreements on Trade in Goods and Trade in Services are required to comply with the GATT and GATS requirements.
Under the above-mentioned FTA requirements, Taipei is most concerned with the question of whether it may 'legally' prohibit Chinese labor from entering Taiwan's employment market and whether it can continue its import ban on Chinese agricultural products. Regarding Chinese labor, Taiwan's prohibition does not relate to its specific services commitments because the GATS does not 'apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market' or measures concerning 'employment on a permanent basis'. 157 Thus, Taiwan is not obliged to open the employment market under the ECFA. However, Taiwan's prohibition of the importation of 830 Chinese agricultural products after signing the ECFA may jeopardize this policy's adherence to the 'substantially all the trade' requirement of Article XXIV:8(b) of the GATT. 158 Arguably, Taiwan's policy does not violate this requirement. Qualitatively speaking, agricultural commodities are an insignificant percentage of cross-straits trade and thus the exclusion of a non-major sector is justified. From a quantitative view, 830 Chinese agricultural products that are currently banned constitute only 7.5% of cross-straits trade, and even with this exclusion, the future cross-straits FTA still meets the 90% benchmark. 159 Given WTO members' lack of consensus on FTA requirements and 'enforcement' procedures regarding WTO-inconsistent FTAs, the differences between a 'model' FTA and the ECFA do not render it invalid. Nonetheless, these differences constitute the ECFA's unique 'cross-straits characteristics' and are expected to be in the spotlight during the CRTA review sessions.
D. The dispute settlement mechanism
Having discussed the ECFA's consistency with WTO rules, it is important to explore how the ECFA's dispute settlement mechanism can safeguard trade interests under the EHP and enable future agreements. The DSM under the ECFA forms the prelude to the legalization of cross-straits economic relations. This mechanism is of importance because both China and Taiwan have been hesitant to resort to the WTO for reasons identified previously. The ECFA ensures that both sides will establish 'appropriate dispute settlement procedures' and will conclude the Cross-Straits Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (Agreement on DSM) within six months after the ECFA takes effect. 160 Before the Agreement on DSM takes effect, disputes arising from the ECFA will be 'resolved through consultations' or by the CSEC Committee. 161 From 1990 to 2010, China and Taiwan concluded 22 agreements, eight of which contain no dispute settlement provisions 162 and 13 of which merely provide that any disputes 'shall be resolved by prompt negotiation' without enforcement procedures. 163 The ECFA is thus the preliminary step for placing the politically volatile cross-straits economic relations under a legal framework. Notwithstanding this significance, the ECFA's dispute settlement provisions fail to effectively safeguard trade interests for the EHP implementation. The ASEAN framework agreements provide three models for dispute settlement mechanisms. First, both the China-ASEAN and India-ASEAN Framework Agreements envision separate agreements on DSM within one year. 164 In the interim period, disputes arising from the agreements' 'interpretation, implementation or application' will be resolved by consultation. 165 approach, but differs in that the DSM is incorporated into the final Japan-ASEAN Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership, rather than concluded in a separate agreement on DSM. 166 Finally, the Korea-ASEAN Framework Agreement was negotiated and took effect concurrently with the Korea-ASEAN Agreement on DSM, which accords jurisdiction over disputes arising from both the EHP under the Framework Agreement and subsequent subject-specific agreements. 167 The first two models bear substantial political risks and provide no legal recourse to either party in the interim period before finalizing the formal dispute settlement agreement. The ASEAN-Korea Framework Agreement model would best serve the interests of China and Taiwan, particularly given the EHP's scale and the possibility of legal disputes arising under the ECFA. However, the ECFA's DSM is modeled after that of the China-ASEAN and the India-ASEAN Framework Agreements primarily because concurrent negotiations for a dispute settlement agreement would postpone the implementation of the EHP, which is essential to Taiwanese industries. As the strong political will that expedited the negotiations also undermines the ECFA's legal stability, the governments should be cautious about the potential dispute settlement issues identified below.
Jurisdictional problems of forum shopping
The future Cross-Straits Agreement on DSM will focus on claims between parties, whereas the Cross-Straits Agreement on Investment (Agreement on Investment) will deal with investor-state claims. As for the former, two potential jurisdictional issues may surface. First, outside the ECFA structure, certain cross-straits agreements concerning trade issues have their own dispute settlement provisions. 168 A respondent in a dispute concerning trade in goods or services may assert that the Agreement on DSM lacks jurisdiction because a complainant is obliged to resolve the dispute only by 'consultation', as stipulated in other cross-straits agreements. The CAFTA would not result in a similar jurisdictional impasse because China and ASEAN do not have free-standing trade-related agreements that contain separate dispute settlement mechanisms outside the CAFTA framework. Therefore, negotiators should pay particular attention to addressing this loophole when drafting the Agreement on DSM. An efficient way to tackle this issue is to accord jurisdiction to the Agreement on DSM over trade disputes that arise from all cross-straits agreements. Second, the overlap of jurisdictions under the WTO and the Cross-Straits Agreement on DSM may complicate cross-straits trade disputes. With the exception of CEPAs, FTAs concluded by China and Taiwan have a similar design to deter 'forum shopping'. Once a complainant files a suit, the forum it chooses 'shall be used to the exclusion of' the respondent. 169 For example, if Panama sued Taiwan under the Taiwan-Panama FTA, the FTA's jurisdictional clause would prohibit Taiwan from resorting to the WTO dispute settlement system. The same rationale applies to a case initiated by ASEAN against China under the CAFTA. This issue arose from an FTA's jurisdictional 'exclusion clause' that appeared in Mexico -Soft Drinks, in which the United States brought a complaint against Mexico's tax measures. 170 Mexico requested that the panel and the Appellate Body decline jurisdiction. Mexico argued that because the case constituted part of 'a broader dispute' it had previously brought against the United States in North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) proceedings, the 'exclusion clause' (i.e., Article 2005(6) of the NAFTA) mandated that the NAFTA be the only forum for the dispute. 171 Both the panel and the Appellate Body disagreed with Mexico. In particular, the Appellate Body found that a WTO panel did not possess 'the authority to decline to rule on the entirety of the claims', and declining its own jurisdiction would 'diminish' a complaining party's right under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 172 In addition, although there might be 'legal impediments' that exclude WTO panels from hearing a case, the Appellate Body found that no such impediments existed in that case. 173 As WTO jurisprudence provides limited guidance on what would constitute 'legal impediments', jurisdictional issues resulting from an FTA's 'exclusion clause' can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. 174 Thus, it is advisable that unlike their FTAs, China and Taiwan should avoid the inclusion of such an exclusion clause in the Agreement on DSM in order to prevent a jurisdictional battle that may prolong the legal process.
Claims by private parties
In addition to above-mentioned inter-state arbitration, investor-state arbitration should be included in the Cross-Straits Agreement on Investment based on the CAFTA model. This agreement, which is comparable to a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), would provide an important investment protection mechanism for investors. China enacted the 1994 Law on the Protection of Investment of Taiwan Compatriots and the 1999 Rules for the Implementation of this law. 175 However, both statutes deem Taiwanese investments to be 'domestic investments' and thus international arbitration is inapplicable for relevant disputes. Furthermore, as Taiwan is not a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), Taiwanese investors cannot resort to the multilateral mechanism within the World Bank for their investment disputes with the Chinese government. 176 In practice, the absence of legal recourse on the Mainland often makes Taiwanese enterprises vulnerable to Chinese local governments' land expropriation and frequent changes in labor and environmental regulations. The incorporation of investor-state arbitration into the ECFA framework will thus provide legal protection to Taiwanese investors in China. Given the increasing numbers of Chinese investors in Taiwan, this arbitration mechanism is also important in safeguarding their business interests. prevented both sides from developing normal trade relations for decades. This background signifies the ECFA's unique status as the most important cross-straits agreement to date. The agreement also represents the first FTA concluded between WTO members with long-standing territorial conflicts. This article examined geopolitical and legal issues that arise from the ECFA with a focus on its relations vis-à-vis East Asian regionalism and WTO rules. It first analyzed why and how the Taiwan Strait became a conspicuous WTO-inconsistent area as a result of China's and Taiwan's cross-straits policies. While the domino effect of proliferating Asian FTAs and changing cross-strait politics led to the ECFA, the agreement now promises to transform bilateral trade ties and further escalate regional integration. The article further explored the ECFA's application of the model provided by ASEAN's framework agreements and its consistency with WTO requirements as an FTA interim agreement. The article found that given limited jurisprudence and WTO members' lack of consensus on such requirements, the ECFA's particular cross-strait characteristics may present obstacles to normal trade relations. Nonetheless, the ECFA represents a significant step toward the legalization of politically volatile bilateral trade and constitutes an indispensible building block for prospective cross-straits economic integration. Moving forward, the article cautioned that the prevention of forum shopping and the creation of an investor-state arbitration mechanism as important subjects for negotiation in the post-ECFA era.
The conclusion of the ECFA marks a milestone both in cross-Taiwan Strait relations and in WTO history. The ECFA may have been inconceivable absent strong political will, but the WTO legal framework was crucial in making this 'mission impossible' possible. While the ECFA's impact on cross-straits ties and East Asian regionalism remains to be seen, this agreement provides an important gateway to regional stability and presents a valuable example of bilateral trade liberalization with the broad framework of the multilateral trading system.
